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Going Side by Side: Defence and Resilience in Swedish Security Policy

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Barbara Gruber

Abstract

Sweden has taken considerable steps towards applying resilience-based approaches in its security policy. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB, has implemented a resilience approach par excellence in their most recent all-hazard strategy. 'Low probability-high impact' risks are systematized and interrelated by exploring the impact of potentialities such as antibiotic resistance, climate change or energy transition. These efforts are part of 'Societal Security', which became the main direction of Swedish Security Strategies during the 2000s. Such a 'wide' security approach can be backtracked to a change in threat perception from war-based scenarios to hybrid threats. Consequently, Sweden has focused its security efforts on 'hybrid threats' and 'societal security' over the past decade. This went hand in hand with taking up resilience-based procedures. In Sweden's most recent 'Defence and Security Policy', however, a shift back to traditional defence strategies indicates a significant change. Sweden's military budget increased for the first time in two decades, and the scenario is dominated by Russia as clearly identifiable threat. While resilience and defence measures appear to go hand in hand in Sweden's security approach, both concepts seem to get more integrated.

Keywords: resilience, security, Sweden, civil contingencies, defence

Zusammenfassung

Resilienz-basierte Ansätze sind in Schwedens Sicherheitsstrategien mittlerweile fest verankert. Vor allem die staatliche Agentur für Zivilschutz (MSB; bis 2014 angesiedelt im Verteidigungsministerium, seither im Justizministerium) hat in den letzten Jahren systematisch einen Resilienz-Ansatz forciert. Als Paradebeispiel dafür gilt eine ihrer jüngsten Strategien, die Gefahren wie verbreitete Antibiotika Resistenz, den Klimawandel und eine großflächige Energiewende, so genannte Risiken mit geringer Wahrscheinlichkeit, aber hoher Wirkung, miteinander verknüpft. Diese Resilienz-basierten Ansätze in Schwedens Sicherheitspolitik sind Teil der konzeptionellen Ausrichtung an ‚gesellschaftlicher Sicherheit‘, die ihre Wurzeln in den 2000er Jahren hat. ‚Gesellschaftliche Sicherheit‘ gehört zu den weiten Sicherheitsansätzen, deren Aufkommen eine Wahrnehmungsverschiebung von Bedrohungen aufzeigt. Statt Kriegs-Szenarien rückten zunehmend ‚hybride‘ Bedrohungen in den Vordergrund, was eine sicherheitspolitische Ausrichtung an Resilienz zur Folge hatte. In der jüngsten schwedischen Sicherheitsstrategie zeichnet sich jedoch ein gegenläufiger Trend ab. Zum ersten Mal seit zwei Dekaden wurde Schwedens Verteidigungsbudget erhöht. Russland, als klares Feindbild, dominiert diese Strategie und rückt traditionelle Verteidigungsmaßnahmen wieder in den Fokus. Obwohl

Resilienz- und Verteidigungsmaßnahmen nach wie vor nebeneinander bestehen, scheinen die Ansätze im Inland zum ersten Mal mehr miteinander verknüpft zu werden.

Schlüsselwörter: Resilienz, Sicherheit, Schweden, Zivilschutz, Verteidigung

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Introduction

Since two decades, the focus of Swedish National Security Strategies is based on the concept of societal security. This is especially relevant in the area of civil emergencies. The notion of societal security has been established in the aftermath of the Cold War and encompasses a shift away from territorial based security, where the main antagonist is a hostile state, to the 'security of the critical functions of society'. As such, societal security is a result of the widening of traditional security concepts in this period. It puts the 'ability of the government and civil society to function, critical infrastructures to be maintained, the democratic ability to govern, to manifest certain basic values' at the centre of security considerations (Sundelius, 2005, p. 26).

As a holistic, all-hazards approach societal security merges several former distinct spheres: 'procedures for war-like scenarios and peace-time emergencies merge, internal and external security are interlocked and the ambitions of enhancing state security and providing citizen safety become blurred' (Sundelius, 2005, p. 23). The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (*Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap* - MSB) is officially responsible for applying societal security and translating it into everyday policies. Formally established in 2009, the MSB was at first an organisational part of the Ministry of Defence, and was moved to the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in 2014.

The main feature of societal security is its emphasis on 'cohesion and physical protection'. Cohesion incorporates the elements that are considered worth to be defended, namely core liberal values such as 'democracy, the rule of law and civil liberties, education, welfare and pluralism' (Brimmer, 2006, p. 31). Consequently, the MSB relies on 'core values' when defining Civil Contingencies Management, and refers to 'human life and health, vital societal functions, democracy, rules of law and human rights, environment and property, national sovereignty', which all shall be protected in cases of emergencies, crisis and war (MSB, 2014a, p. 11).

At the conceptual level, this approach is a consequence of the 'widening' of security from the narrow realm of defence against clearly identifiable threats to an all-encompassing, trans-boundary and proactive concept which is dealing with risks (Pospisil 2013: 30). According to Daase (2010: 23), European societies became accustomed to peace which in turn raised the demands for security. As a result, all-encompassing security concepts were implemented. But the conceptual widening of

security entailed to dissolve former distinct areas of security like ‘inside-outside, war-crime and military-police’ (Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 694).

Bigo et al. (2014, p. 8) propose in relation to the Nordic countries that ‘societal security gradually morphed into societal resilience’. It is possible to trace such a process of morphing in the Swedish case. As Rhinard (2007, pp. 13-14) has pointed out, the former conceptualization of Swedish security policy as a system of ‘total defence’ supported this transformation. Nevertheless, the shift from threats to risks triggered new organising principles and engages actors formerly not associated with the security realm. Against this background, this working paper will discuss the following questions:

- What are the specific reasons for the transformation of Swedish Security Policy?
- How are concepts such as resilience, defence and security interrelated?
- Which (new) institutions and processes did these transformations produce?

From ‘Total Defence’ to ‘Societal Security’

Sweden was among the states who had a strong ‘total defence’ system in place during the Cold War. ‘Total defence’ conceptually blurs the boundaries between military and civil as it aims at actively involving the whole society during a war or other situations of high alert. Although this ‘total defence’ system is still in place, it has been subject to significant changes that have decreased its functionality. Nevertheless, the concept provides a fertile structural background for the inclusion of societal actors in security concerns.

In the early 2000s, ideas of ‘societal security’ gained attractiveness in Swedish policy circles, mainly as a result of trans-boundary crisis situations (e.g. the Y2K problem) (Myrdal, 2008, p. 57). Those civil emergency situations led to the perception that the nature of threats has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War and a new way of dealing with them was needed. This led to the inauguration of SEMA (Swedish Emergency Management Agency) in 2002 (Myrdal, 2008, p. 54).

The policy shift from ‘total defence’ to ‘societal security’ became clearly visible in the Swedish Government Bill from 2004, ‘Our Future Defence (2004-2005)’. Military funding, particularly regarding equipment and personnel, decreased substantially. In turn, crisis management and emergency preparedness were strengthened in the defence bill (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 29-31). Civil defence, a substantial component of the ‘total defence’ system, was subsequently moulded into societal security. A new feature of societal security was the inclusion of a variety of new stakeholders: ‘Long-term efforts by central agencies, municipalities, county councils, organisations

and the business sector are needed to create an adequate crisis management capability, where priority can be allocated to the most effective measures in the event of a severe peacetime emergency occurring in society' (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 29).

Rhinard (2007, p. 11-12) emphasizes that 'total defence' provided the necessary background for such a multi-level approach, as it had already been built on elements of bottom-up security. However, 'total defence' dealt just with exceptional situations, like a threat to state territory. The new focus was put on long-term efforts and aimed at a permanent inclusion of the private sector. Lindberg and Sundelius (2012, p. 1298) interpret this development against the background of financial requirements of the state: 'Disaster resilience is about shared risks but also about shared costs'.

The principle of resilience emerges along with this turn to societal security: 'The Government wishes to emphasise that there is a clear connection between measures aimed at safeguarding a strengthened peacetime capability and measures taken in times of heightened preparedness. Investing in preventive and preparatory measures to reduce vulnerability and increase flexibility in vital social systems and functions will result in fewer resources needed for the civil defence' (SG 2004: 31). The reference to vital social systems and to the reduction of vulnerability are key characteristics of resilience; these elements are meant to substitute resource-intensive civil defence measures. The first reason for the shift from 'civil defence' to broad measures of resilience is the reduction of costs for security in a long-term perspective. The second reason is the epistemological shift from foreseeable threats to uncertainty and risk. Lindberg and Sundelius (2012, p. 1298) hence interpret the invocation of resilience as an answer to the necessity of tackling uncertainty and complexity in a time of shrinking national budgets. Bigo et al. (2014, p. 8) underlines that the societal security orientation of the Nordic countries already anticipated resilience measures: 'Societal security gradually morphed into societal resilience'.

In the further course of the 2000s, 'total defence' became more and more perceived as being obsolete. On the one hand, the perception of threats changed significantly. Attacks on the territory became less likely, whereas the interdependencies of critical functions of society were increasingly perceived as the main security concern. On the other hand, shrinking national budgets and the privatisation of substantial parts of critical infrastructure led to a reorganisation of the whole area of 'civil defence'. As a consequence, the whole area of civil contingencies became reorganised under the broad umbrella of 'societal security'. Along with this reorganisation, the basic ideas of resilience were already put in place.

Institutional Repercussions – Inauguration of the MSB

As in the UK (e.g. the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease in 2000-01) and the US (e.g. Hurricane Katrina 2005), particular events led to a restructuring of the Swedish disaster management system and its bundling in a central agency (Smith, 2003, p. 412; Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1299): a tsunami in the year 2004, resulting in the death of 500 Swedish people, triggered the installation of the MSB. The MSB subsequently replaced the Swedish Rescue Service Agency (SRSA), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the National Board of Psychological Defence (SPF). The civil contingency agency was formerly installed in 2009, as a consequence of the 2004 tsunami, following years of deliberations.

As a leftover from the old 'total defence' system, the Swedish government is still in a formal partnership with 18 voluntary defence organisation, comprising 400,000 members (Rhinard & Bakken, 2013, p. 22). The distribution of their funding was transferred to the MSB, which resulted in spending cuts and led to a disadvantage for bigger organizations. Yet, those organisations are still tasked with operational exercises, especially in the field of emergency preparedness and crisis management. And they are still able to offer substantial advantages, since they have a strong tradition in Swedish society and their structures and branches are dispersed throughout the country and well-represented also on the local level.

The Swedish government, according to a government bill from 2008 (MSB 2008), requires the MSB to 'support and coordinate societal information security work, as well as analyse and assess global developments in this field'. This includes especially to provide advice and support for other government authorities, the municipalities and the county councils, as well as the private sector and civil society organisations. Lindberg and Sundelius (2012, p. 1299) assert that the MSB is 'both an engine and a champion to create and facilitate a whole-of-society approach with diverse, and sometimes unevenly motivated, stakeholders'. Indeed, as Rhinard (2007, p. 16) points out, sectoral differences are an obstacle to a multi-actor and multi-level approach. Accordingly, identified problems with the organisation of a whole-of-society approach are the 'mental gaps that tend to separate distinct professions with different training and backgrounds' (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1300). This refers especially to gaps between military and civil spheres, different government branches, the private and public sector and also the voluntary organisations.

The MSB symbolises, but also operationalises the fundamental change from defence to societal security. Conceptually, this is expressed through their all-hazard, future-oriented policies. In this regard, resilience is widely applied in contexts of inevitable change, like in cases of climate change, antibiotic resistance or energy transition. Such inevitable changes are portrayed as life-threatening to society as a whole, especially as such events cannot be covered by social welfare systems. In cases such as widespread antibiotic resistance this would also become unbearably cost-intensive (MSB, 2014b, p. 16). Therefore, transformations in organizational procedures are proposed that shall reduce dependencies, like in the food system and the energy system (small-scale energy production and redundancy through diversification, cf. MSB, 2014b, p. 26, 33). The cost factor is also highlighted in consequences of climate change, particularly concerning food and water supply. The slow societal adaption society in lifestyle is the proposed solution to this changing environment (e.g. MSB, 2014b, p. 26). These policies, and especially their long-term perspective, can be interpreted in what Corry (2012, p. 21) describes as 'long-term societal engineering through innovation, governance and cooperation'.

Another important feature of risk awareness is that the MSB's task in counter-terrorism is located in the CIP area under the heading 'reducing the vulnerability of society to terrorist attacks' (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 25). The MSB is thus leading the national work group on explosives safety, consisting of defence related government branches, as well as the Swedish Transport Agency and the Swedish Customs (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 25). The MSB's work can be considered to act 'response based', since they prepare in a general manner for emergencies deriving from different causes and work with already established institutions along the aim of increasing effectiveness.

Still headed by the Ministry of Defence, the MSB was inaugurated as an interface between different governmental branches and the wider public. An interface was perceived as necessary, as civil contingencies reached a dimension surpassing the existing capacities. A further explanation for the inauguration of the MSB is that civil contingencies were increasingly perceived as complex. The notion of 'complexity' in turn invoked the necessity for different actors to coordinate and thus created new modes of governance. In Sweden, this was facilitated through a central agency, which coordinates decentralized as well as centralized structures. Therefore, the MSB as an interface, conceptually speaking, absorbs defence related and resilience related issues under the grand umbrella of societal security.

Bigo et al. (2014, p. 13) point out that the Swedish case is remarkable as the MSB has its own research budget and defines autonomously which topics are to be researched, mainly in the form of 'foresight' studies. This clearly gives the agency some autonomy. Such foresight scenarios are a form of risk governance, for example described by Huysmans (2014, p. 102): '[...] risk has become a fluid concept that refers to techniques of making future events knowable so that they can be acted upon in today's decisions'. In this regard, future risks are assembled by the MSB according to their future budgetary and economic impacts. Therefore, the next section will examine the MSB's role by emphasising two central features: (1) the role and limit of the MSB as an interface and (2) the MSB as producer of (future) knowledge.

Societal Security and Resilience in Action

Although the general heading leading the work of the MSB is still 'societal security', its components get more and more interchangeable with resilience: 'In other words, there must be resilience; the ability of society to prevent, resist, manage and recover' (MSB, 2014a, p. 5). Disaster resilience in the Swedish approach is described as a 'whole-of-society' endeavour: 'The notion of resilience, usually described as a capacity to "withstand" or "bounce back" in the face of a disturbance, can be applied to citizens, organizations, technological systems and societies as a whole. It includes proactive mitigation, as well as speedy response and recovery and relies on the ability among a range of interdependent stakeholders to share information and take coordinated action' (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1297).

The variety of actors engaged in emergency management calls for enhanced communications among them. Rhinard (2007, p. 13) emphasises this point, because 'state-centric and sectoral-specific blinkers' are a danger to modern security issues itself. Lindberg and Sundelius (2012, p. 1301) stress that threats become more complex and their sources will not immediately be known, therefore cooperation between police forces and first responders must be developed beforehand. Building trust is the central issue, as the security sector and the first responder have different approaches to information sharing and transparency (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1301). Therefore, the Swedish counter-terrorism strategy especially insists on procedures for information sharing (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 17).

Resilience as new organizational mode centres on two foundations: (1) disasters are perceived as inevitable and cost-intensive, thus measures to mitigate the effects must be taken to safeguard

society (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1298); (2) resilience is enacted mainly through communication: 'a key aspect during the implementation of the measures and activities in the action plan is communication. It is essential to continuously update and share information among the various entities regarding measures, activities and their results, and to create involvement among the entities' (MSB, 2014a, p. 17).

Such resilience-communication shall work through the following processes:

1) Dialogue

Dialogue between state agencies and private sector entities about measures and regulations regarding systematic safety, reducing vulnerabilities and to enhance redundancy are facilitated (MSB, 2014a, p. 17). Each public sector is supposed to identify the operators most vital for societal functioning and has the responsibility to enhance the cooperation with the respective owners and operators (MSB, 2014a, 18). However, respective regulations are not set up yet (MSB, 2014a, 25). To date, the MSB has installed cross-sectoral arenas of 'coordination and cooperation' to discuss issues of risk and vulnerability. At the moment the MSB assessed that it established an overview of cross-sectoral risks and vulnerabilities through these arenas (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). Therefore, focus points surfaced which receive greater attention. Thus, instead of creating new arenas around emerging issues, the already established ones are used 'smarter' in relation to specified topics and tasks (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016).

Despite the advances of the coordination arenas, formal partnerships with the private sector were just achieved with the energy branch; the inclusion of the private sector is still pursued through the sectoral (government) agencies. The main achievement of the MSB in enhancing the cooperation between different agencies around one topic is to finance cross-sectoral cooperation projects (joint exercise, joint training) with the aim of generating new knowledge (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). With the financial sector (banks) and in the area of cyber and information security, cooperation in the form of the aforementioned 'fora' are set up. Resulting from a lack of awareness, other areas, like pharmaceuticals, are not yet included (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). Clearly, Sweden is trying to apply a whole-of-government approach under the heading of 'societal security'. This follows the argument proposed by resilience literature which describes the inclusion of the private sector as the 'ideal' state (e.g. Prior & Hagman, 2014, p. 287). In practice, however, this proves to be challenging.

2) Information sharing and the construction of a knowledge base

Building up a knowledge base and information sharing are the critical tasks between those different entities. Joint trainings and cooperation aim to facilitate a multi-actor and multi-level approach (MSB, 2014a, p. 17, 27). Impact analysis and assessment for local-level consequences of different disruptive events (e.g. floods, landslides) are one of the main tasks of the MSB, who collects the data and evaluates it (MSB, 2014a, p. 17). On an organisational level, all these measures and activities shall also enhance the trust between different entities and people, which is considered as an asset per se during a crisis (e.g. Longstaff & Yang, 2008).

Counter-terrorism is strongly focused on preventive measures. Therefore, Sweden has a separate strategy in place, which is called 'Actions to Make Society More Resilient to Violent Extremisms'. The counter-terrorism strategy (called 'Prevent, Pre-empt, Protect') has also a significant emphasis on the construction of a knowledge base (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 10). The aim in this regard is to increase society's insights about terrorism: 'The Government considers that the best way of tackling propaganda for violent extremism and terrorism is by providing knowledge' (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 11). The natural playing field for the MSB is located in the 'protect' area of the counter-terrorism strategy, particularly concerning the protection of critical infrastructure. Again, knowledge sharing, in terms of risk and vulnerability analysis, plays a prominent role (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 26). Knowledge production in this area is usually a form of risk governance. The MSB is explicitly tasked with that issue, due to its role as an interface, because critical infrastructure is to a large extent privately owned. Nevertheless, terrorism was just recently added to the field of civil emergency management (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 26).

Security vs. Resilience

The MSB features as the main facilitator in civil emergencies. Nevertheless, the 'hard' security measures are still part of traditional security actors, like the police, the intelligence services and the military. Whereas the MSB plays a prominent role in 'protection' area and to some extent in the 'prevent' area of the counter-terrorism strategy, the agency is quite absent in 'pre-emption'. 'Pre-emption' is still considered as being a matter of 'hard' security issues. In case of an actual terrorist attack, 'security' and 'resilience' measures are strictly separated: the handling of the attack, or rather the handling of the adversaries, is headed by the police (under special circumstances, the military is included as well). Crisis management, communication and information sharing to media and the public – with an explicit mentioning of having a trusted government institution – is part of the MSB's

work, to be done in cooperation with the rescue services, SOS Alarm and the ambulance (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 33). Concerning cyber-security in the realm of terrorism, the threats and vulnerability analysis are part of the security apparatus, while the MSB 'is invited to take part in the work of the group where necessary' (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 28).

Cyber-security generally, on the other hand, is covered by different strategies, because 'previous proposed strategies have tried to remedy all problems and challenges in the whole of society in one context, which creates overwhelming challenges' (Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 22). Therefore, the new strategy for 2015 is exclusively concerned with the provision of cyber-security inside the central government. For this particular area of oversight, the MSB is tasked to take on the 'general oversight mandate for government agencies' (Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 24).

The Comeback of Defence

During the 1990s and 2000s, there was a noticeable turn towards demilitarization in Swedish security policy, which is particularly demonstrated by the aforementioned budget cuts for defence. A further indicator for the decreasing importance of the traditional tasks of the military was highlighted by a White Paper in 2009. Here it was clearly stated that the protection of Sweden's territorial integrity is equally important to the participation in global crisis management operations (Nuenlist, 2013, p. 2). However, the current outlook for 2016-2020 shows a different picture. For the first time in two decades, Sweden increased its military budget (Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 3). As a consequence of the events in Georgia and the Ukraine, the military spending and the emphasis on defence is now on the rise (Holmberg, 2015, p. 247). Sweden's Defence Policy focuses on a war scenario, and particularly on Russia as a clearly identifiable potential enemy: 'Swedish Defence Policy for the years 2016-2020 must be based upon the declining security environment in Europe' (Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 3). This has already led to several crucial changes: for example, in 2004 it was commissioned that the isle of Gotland was partly suspended by the Armed Forces; in 2015, a unit was recommissioned there (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 24; Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 3). Further striking examples are the reallocation of funds from international missions to national trainings (Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, the intelligence sector is regaining a stronger role (Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 5). The most significant change in this regard concerns the renewed focus on territorial military defence after years of mainly international military operations, so defence is coming home. Nevertheless, defence is coming back in a new fashion. The former total

defence concept is now concerned with transboundary threats and risks as well as with traditional territory defence (MSB, email correspondence, August 8th, 2016).

The shift is also visible in the current agenda-setting of the MSB. Accordingly, the MSB is now also concerned with war situations and was tasked with the coordination of the civilian efforts. Maintaining a 'sufficient level of preparedness' is described as a challenge in addition to the peacetime tasks of the MSB (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). The re-invocation of defence can also be seen in the area of CIP, where the MSB is responsible for 'additional measures' during situations of heightened alert to coordinate civil defence (MSB, 2014a, p. 19). In the 'Action Plan for Uncertain Futures', the MSB is also covering concerns of 'traditional security policy' in instances such as future scenarios when the Arctic power balance might turn into a military issue (MSB, 2014b, p. 23). Furthermore, the MSB incorporates the problem of energy supply and production as well as climate change in a larger picture, as such issues might lead to global conflicts that may lead to severe consequences for Sweden's internal security (MSB, 2014b, p. 32).

Conclusion

In Sweden, the post-Cold War trend of 'widening' security unfolded in several policy agendas in the early 2000s. Especially the 'Defence Bill' from 2004 makes the shift to peace-time emergencies visible. Therefore, issues of homeland security in the wider realm of emergency management became more prominent. The notion of 'societal security', a wide security concept par excellence, was installed as the new orientation. Rather than threats, societal security aims at covering risks in a society increasingly perceived as complex, especially in the realm of 'vital societal functions'. 'Vital societal functions' denominates a systematization of classical CIP in a broader context, as it incorporates system functionality and issues of human organization surrounding the systems. Societal security consequently encompasses a future-oriented, long-term perspective to prepare for all kinds of risks, which could be devastating for a highly interdependent society.

Financial considerations are an important aspect in this regard. As a result, Swedish security policy was based on the assumption that preparation and mitigation measures would reduce the costs in the long-term. Institutionally, the MSB, the Civil Contingencies Agency, emerged as the interface between civil defence and these new processes. Further structural changes in the organisation of state-based civil emergency were also necessary, because of government budget cuts as well as that providers of infrastructure, termed as 'critical', increasingly were privatized or emerged as privately

owned. Nevertheless, Sweden's security policy background of 'total defence' provided a fertile ground for the invocation of different organizations in the re-organization for internal security.

New processes to organise state structures *and* society for civil emergencies in this changing environment were needed to keep up with a sufficient level of 'preparedness'. But the introduction of 'complexity' also resulted in a new awareness, which shifted the emphasis from covering threats to emerging risks. But risks are still deemed to be governable. They are tackled through a variety of actions, aimed at securing the future of society's survival despite drastic changes. 'Complexity' just signifies an enhanced necessity to coordinate, to prepare and to raise awareness. Therefore, communication measures to facilitate engagement between different government agencies and private stakeholders, as well as the public, were introduced through the MSB. Nevertheless, such engagement is demanding in terms of time and costs, and the MSB's role as 'interface' not just between different public or private entities, but also between diverging demands proves to be challenging. Diverging demands can be seen in 'hard' security measures, dealing with actual threats like a terrorist attack or cyber-security, where the traditional defence community has the lead role. Nevertheless, a more integrating conceptual basis, which resilience provided, was needed to renovate the total defence system. But neither societal security nor resilience ever completely replaced defence or 'traditional' security. The comeback of a clear threat-based scenario subsequently lead to a greater entanglement between defence and resilience. Considering the most recent budget allocations, however, defence is again expanding its role. Although defence does so in a novel way, as especially risks became transboundary issues and cannot be addressed in an isolated manner.

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